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Oil and other energy commodities 
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Abstract. This chapter provides a survey of studies concerning the relationship between crude 
oil prices and other energy commodities such as coal and natural gas. Although such an 
assessment demands an interdisciplinary approach to provide readers with important background 
information, the approach taken here is based upon the economics of the energy market. The 
empirical studies summarized here can be categorized into three groups: time series studies 
analyzing market integration between oil and other energy commodities, studies that examine the 
predictive content of futures prices for energy, and the role of tail risk in explaining price 
volatilities of oil and other energy commodities. Several suggestions for future research are 
offered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Coal, oil, and gas have been the primary fuels of the modern industrial economy since the past 
250 years. “If coal drove the industrial revolution, oil fueled the internal-combustion engine, 
aviation”2 and every realm of modern life. Natural gas, due to its availability, affordability, and 
environmental acceptability is likely to be the most preferred fuel of the 21st century. 
In recent years, prices of natural gas and coal are exhibiting similar volatility that is usually 
seen in crude oil prices. The main reasons behind the increased price volatility are market 
liberalization and greater international trade of these primary energy fuels. In that process, both 
natural gas and coal are increasingly exposed to the same common factors affecting crude oil 
prices. It’s no wonder that the behavior of natural gas and coal prices are getting more like that 
of crude oil prices (Figures 1 and 2). 
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Figure 1. Oil and gas prices 
 
Historically, a simple 10-to-1 and 6-to-1 rule of thumb have been used to relate natural gas 
prices to those for crude oil (Brown and Yücel 2008). According to this rule, a $50 WTI crude 
oil per barrel would mean a natural gas price of $5 per million Btu at Henry Hub. In practice, the 
relative price relationship is more complex is determined by a variety of demand- and supply-
side factors.3  
Despite being a highly polluting fuel (relative to natural gas), coal still accounts for roughly 
one-third of global energy and makes up 40% of electricity generation. The price of coal follows 
a cycle like oil even though their demand and supply are affected by different dynamics. Since 
2010, both coal and oil prices have been falling roughly in tandem and the common factor 
behind this price decline is a massive production of the US shale gas. 
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Figure 2. Oil and coal prices 
 
Regardless of all the environmental concerns with using fossil fuels, the world has been 
consuming more fossil fuels and global energy appetite is projected to grow by 28% between 
2015 and 2040 (Figure 3). Driven by strong economic growth, most of the demand for fossil fuel 
is expected to come from Asia, especially China and India. 
While direct competition and substitution between these primary fuels are somewhat limited 
in the short-term, depending on their respective costs of conversion technologies, they may 
become a much closer economic substitute in the long-term (Bachmeier and Griffin 2006). Oil 
can always replace gas, depends if we accept a higher CO2 emission factor. Both oil and coal are 
easy to transport and store, compared to gas which has the lowest energy density. 
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2017 
Figure 3. World energy consumption by energy source 
 
Recognizing the crucial importance of the three fossil fuels to the economy, over the past 
decades a large number of papers have been written on oil prices and other energy commodities. 
The goal of this chapter is to summarize the recent empirical literature on the relationship 
between oil price and other energy commodities. These studies are categorized into three groups. 
The first group of studies examines market integration among fossil fuels, primarily in the 
context of the United States. The second group of studies examines the predictive content of 
futures energy prices in forecasting spot prices, while the final set of studies look at the role of 
tail risk in energy commodities. 
 
2. The interaction between crude oil and other energy commodity prices 
 
There is no better way to understand the complex interaction among crude oil, natural gas, and 
coal prices than to analyze the power generation industry, which simultaneously uses all three 
fuels to generate electricity. And nowhere the story gets more interesting than the United States 
where the forces of regulation, technology, market forces provide an intriguing narrative.  
Unlike industrial use, consumers’ relationship with these primary fossil fuels is rather 
inflexible. Consumers drive cars that run on petroleum and heat their houses with natural gas. No 
matter how volatile prices are, fuel switching between oil and gas is not a practical option for the 
consumer because of high adjustment costs. Whereas, direct use of coal as a fuel is limited to 
cooking and heating in some parts of the world.  
During the late 1960s, there was a sign of growing concerns about emissions from coal-fired 
power plants in the United States. On November 25, 1966, the front page of the New York Times 
featured an image of the New York City engulfed in high levels of smoke and haze. In fact, the 
air was so filthy that one resident of New York City quipped: “I not only saw the pollution, I 
wiped it off my windowsills,” (Dwyer, 2017).  Meanwhile, increasing oil production along with 
low and stable crude oil prices during the 1960s was the catalyst for many to shift from coal- to 
petroleum-fired power plants. By the early 1970s, the share of oil in electric power generation 
culminated to around 20 percent, the highest share ever (Figure 4). However, the two great oil 
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shocks in 1973-74 and 1979 have eliminated the cost advantage and oil was virtually banished 
from power production (Figure 4). Furthermore, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 
1978 (PIFUA) had simultaneously restricted the construction of new petroleum and gas power 
plants and encouraged the construction of new coal-based power plants. As a result, during the 
1980s—when global crude oil prices were on a downhill especially in the second half of 1980s—
coal’s share in power generation expanded (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Annual share of fossil-fired electric power generation 
 
A combination of factors has led to a sudden and welcome change in the power sector. First, 
the PIFUA was repealed in 1987 by President Ronald Regan to pave the way for America’s 
energy independence and energy security. Second, by the early 1990s, the natural gas market in 
the United States (as well as the United Kingdom) was fully deregulated allowing fuel 
substitution between petroleum and natural gas as a fuel for peaking generation. Higher profit 
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margin driven by the availability of tax credits, in conjunction with the increased use of efficient 
combined cycle technology for power production, was responsible for much of the growth of the 
natural gas produced in the United States during the 1990s. Fast forward to the 2000s, the rapid 
rise of domestic shale gas production has not only contributed to a relatively sustained period of 
low natural gas prices, but it has also further encouraged power plant operators to use more 
combined-cycle units by gradually displacing coal generation (Figure 4).  
The basic mechanism underlying the interaction between oil and gas can be traced through 
both demand- and supply-side channels.4 The demand side channel concerns to what extent (or 
how easily) energy consumers can switch to natural gas when, say, the price of oil increases. One 
way to examine this is by estimating the value of elasticity of substitution. For the United States, 
the EIA’s (2012) estimate of oil-gas elasticity is 1.89, which reflects plant operators’ flexibility 
to choose the most economic fuel and the fact that some combustion turbine and combined-cycle 
units are designed to run on either petroleum or natural gas. In contrast, the estimated oil-coal 
elasticity is -0.63, indicating that the two fuels are complements rather than substitutes. Based on 
a meta-analysis of 47 studies, Stern (2012) finds that compared to the United States the extent of 
interfuel substitution is higher in India, Korea, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. Particularly, 
for the industrial sector, the estimated elasticities for coal-oil, oil-gas, oil-electricity5, and gas-
electricity are significantly greater than unity, which Stern (2012) considers as good news for 
climate mitigation policies concerning replacing dirty fuels (e.g. coal) with relatively cleaner 
fuels (e.g. gas). 
On the supply side, a higher price, say, encourages more drilling which in turn increases 
production of associated or dissolved gas, that comes along as a basically free byproduct when 
petroleum is produced. In fact, the production of associated gas has become so prominent in the 
United States in recent years that it triggered an inverse relationship between oil and natural gas 
prices (Clemente, 2018).6 Furthermore, a higher oil price may lead to a competition for the 
resource in the sense that skilled labors and drilling equipment are redirected from gas to oil 
sector due to price differential and increased level of activity. 
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A better way to understand substitutability or complementariness among fuels is by looking 
at the sources and usage of fuels. Figure 5 shows the primary energy sources and their 
consuming sectors in 2017 in the United States. As can be seen, in both the transportation and 
residential sectors, the extent of fuel overlapping is marginal. Only in the industrial and electric 
power sectors, there is an opportunity for fuel substitutability.  
 
 
Figure 5. U.S. primary energy consumption by source and sector, 2017 
Source: EIA. Total = 97.7 quadrillion British thermal unit (Btu) 
 
3. Empirical evidence 
3.1 Market integration 
 
In empirical research, due to the nonstationarity of energy prices, the most common and 
preferred way to study the integration among oil, gas and coal markets is by means of time series 
methods. Thanks to the availability of energy prices at a higher frequency, several studies have 
used cointegration and error correction techniques to quantify the short- and long-run 
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relationship among prices of fossil fuels. Particularly, cointegration is widely used as a method 
for testing market integration.  
Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) apply error correction model to test market integration both 
within and between crude oil, coal and natural gas markets. The within market integration in 
crude oil and coal is quite strong, but market integration between the three primary energy fuels 
is rather weak. Villar and Joutz (2006) find that the WTI oil price and Henry Hub gas price are 
cointegrated around a time trend over the period 1989-2005. The statistical significance of the 
coefficient of time trend suggests that, following a shock, natural gas price grows faster to 
narrow the gap with crude oil prices. Baffes (2007) finds that out of 35 internationally traded 
primary commodities, the pass-through of crude oil prices to natural gas was highest with an 
estimated elasticity of 0.64.  
Hartley et al. (2008) derive several interesting results from their empirical study. Unlike 
previous studies that document a direct relationship between crude oil and natural gas prices, 
Hartley et al. find that oil prices affect natural gas prices via an indirect route, the residual fuel 
oil (or heavy fuel oil). This is not surprising since for many years industries and electric power 
plants in the United States have treated natural gas and residual fuel oil as close substitutes, using 
whichever fuel was less expensive (Brown and Yücel 2008). Another way of interpreting this 
result is that both the U.S. natural gas and residual oil prices respond to the changes in 
international crude oil price, but not the other way around. 
Brown and Yücel (2008) fill a gap in the literature by examining how the relationship 
between natural gas and crude oil change when external factors such as weather, inventories and 
disruptions to production are considered. Despite the strong relationship between crude oil and 
natural gas, both energy prices have considerable independent movement. They find that the 
prices of both natural gas and crude oil are cointegrated and the causality is running from oil to 
natural gas prices. The results of the error correction models reveal that when natural gas prices 
deviate from the long-run equilibrium relationship with crude oil, natural gas prices adjust by 
roughly 6 percent a week to close the gap between the two. The rate of adjustment is doubled (12 
percent per week) when the external factors are included in the analysis. The short-term 
dynamics of natural gas prices are driven by a variety of transitory and other exogenous factors, 
while in the long-term the history of natural gas prices contributes to its motion. 
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However, Ramberg and Persons (2012) have shown that the cointegrating relationship 
between crude oil and natural gas prices has changed over time. Put another way, the historical 
relationship documented in earlier studies cannot be used as a reliable predictor of the natural gas 
prices, at least in the longer horizon. One possible explanation for the shifting long-run 
equilibrium relationships between crude oil and natural gas prices is the improvement of 
technology in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing to makes it possible to extract shale gas 
at a relatively low cost.  
In conventional time series methods such as cointegration, the frequency and time 
components of economic series are analyzed separately. Time-frequency techniques such as 
wavelet analysis study overcome this limitation by studying the frequency components of time 
series without losing the time information. Vacha and Barunik (2012) apply the wavelet method 
to analyze co-movement among four energy variables (crude oil, gasoline, heating oil, and 
natural gas). Their results suggest that while heating oil, gasoline, and crude oil strongly comove, 
natural gas is unrelated to the three commodities. From the investment perspective, this finding 
implies incorporating natural gas in a well-diversified commodity portfolio. 
  
3.2 The predictive content of energy futures 
 
Energy prices, especially oil price, have a historical relationship with macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Hamilton (2001) pointed out that 10 of the 11 postwar recessions in the United 
States have been preceded by a sharp increase in oil price. Recognizing this relationship, Chinn 
et al. (2005) examine whether futures prices are unbiased and/or accurate predictors of 
subsequent spot prices in the markets for crude oil, natural gas, gasoline, and heating oil. In so 
doing, Chinn et al. consider the following regression specification: 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑓𝑡,𝑡−𝑘 − 𝑠𝑡−𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
where the left-hand side of (1) is the change in the spot rate and the term in parentheses on 
the right-hand side is called the “basis” in the commodity futures literature. The composite null 
hypothesis is 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1, where a rejection implies the rejection of the joint hypothesis of 
market efficiency and unbiased expectations. 
Chinn et al. find that only for natural gas, futures prices have some ability to predict future 
spot prices, especially at the longer horizon (12 months). This result seems a bit surprising given 
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the very high comovement among the prices of different energy products. In a subsequent study, 
Chinn and Coibion (2013) use a regression like equation (1) and find that by exploiting 
information from heating oil and natural gas, one can anticipate a larger fraction of ex-post oil 
price changes. Their results suggest that oil futures prices do not only fail to predict its own ex-
post price changes but also prices of other commodities. Moreover, since the mid-2000s the 
effectiveness of the predictive content of energy (and commodity) futures has sharply reduced. 
In a recent paper, Jin (2016) proposed a future-based unobserved components forecasting 
model of crude oil price that utilizes the term structure of the future prices as additional 
regressors. Compared to Chinn and Coibion (2013), Jin’s (2016) model provides better forecasts 
of oil price due to the latter’s more granular assessment of the changing short-term component 
volatility or the changing market conditions.  
 
3.3 Tail risk 
 
Since the 2007-08 global financial crisis, ‘tail risk’ has become a buzzword among commodity 
traders and investors in energy markets. Tail risk is a low probability event that has an outsize 
impact on prices. Event such as the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, tsunami in Japan, the Federal 
Reserve’s possible tapering of asset purchases and unrest in the Middle East caught many 
investors by surprise and the belated realization that safeguarding their portfolios against such 
events (both large and small) must become a more integral part of their investment strategy (The 
Economist 2012). Indeed, the survey of institutional investors shows that not only they routinely 
underestimate tail risk events, but the commonly used volatility-based risk management tools 
such as value-at-risk (VaR) also produce artificially depressed volatilities (The Economist 2012, 
Grepin et al. 2010).7  
There is a growing body of empirical work8 analyzing the impact of tail risk on asset market, 
but relatively few studies on the role of tail risk in explaining oil price volatility. The main 
reason for focusing on tail risk is to gauge the forecasting power of future asset returns that is not 
contained in traditional asset price predictors. Ellwanger (2017) finds that the tail risk measures 
 
7
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prices, and even the cost of agriculture raw materials where oil is used as an input. 
8
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have strong predictability for crude oil futures and spot returns. Furthermore, the option-implied 
tail risk premia convey important information on price dynamics of crude oil than traditional 
macroeconomic and oil market uncertainty measures. 
Ewing et al. (2002) find that volatility in the natural gas market is indirectly affected by 
events originating in the oil sector. However, their results also show that a change in volatility in 
natural gas returns affects the volatility in oil returns (with a lag), implying that options traders in 
oil market may benefit by keeping a close eye on events in the natural gas market. On the other 
hand, based on daily natural gas and crude oil futures price data, Pindyck (2004) found that crude 
oil volatility has significant predictive power with respect to natural gas volatility but not the 
other way around. Unlike Ewing et al. (2002), Pindyck found volatility persistent to be short-
lived, implying that fluctuations in volatility are unlikely to impact the value of real options in 
oil- or gas-related investment. 
Besides exerting a direct effect in the form of higher gasoline prices, unanticipated oil price 
shocks affect expectations about the future path of the price of oil which in turn feed into the 
calculations of the net present value of investment decision (Baumeister and Kilian 2016). A 
case in point is shale gas production in the US, which requires a crude oil price of $60 a barrel 
for shale gas to be economically viable. Hence, when oil price is rising, the shale gas sector 
attracts more investment than expected, whereas the momentum quickly turns reverse when oil 
price collapses. 
The 2018 US-China trade war is yet another sign of how a dramatic shock in oil market 
could spillover into other energy commodities. Following the US’s duties on Chinese imports, 
China is contemplating to impose a 25% tariff on crude oil and other energy commodities 
(Kumon 2018). However, China is not banning import of US LNG, which is seen vital to the 
country’s shift away from coal as it fights deteriorating air pollution. At the same time, China is 
considering importing more gas from the Middle East is rising. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Oil shaped the 20th century through wars and prosperity. Against many predictions that the 
influence of crude oil would wane as new supplies and sources of energy become abundant, oil’s 
dominance remains entrenched at least in the first half of the 21st century. A primary reason for 
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this is the extremely slow process of changing the global fuel mix toward more cleaner energy 
sources. The most likely outcome for oil in the coming decades is a long plateau, rather than a 
sharp decline. 
Despite the vast literature on the nexus between oil prices and other energy commodities, 
there is much room for future research. First, as the supply of natural gas becomes abundant and 
stable, will gas follow oil to become a liquid global market with growing disconnection from oil 
production and prices? Second, what if citizens of richer countries decide to stop buying oil from 
countries with highly repressive governments such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela? What would 
be the potential impacts of such a low probability event on oil price and the resulting spillover 
into other energy commodities? Third, compared to about 40 years in the US, the average age of 
the coal plants in Asia in only 11 years.9 Given a lifetime of 50 years, there is still plenty of coal 
to be burnt in Asia. As gas price is rising in response to increasing demand in Asia, how will 
China and India trade-off the use of coal and gas in their energy mix will be a very important 
topic of discussing in the decades ahead? Finally, it is still not clear why the predictive content of 
futures prices has become less important for subsequent price changes of energy products, and 
whether incorporating a richer dynamic specification of the spot and futures prices would yield 
superior forecasts. 
As public policymakers and business professionals closely track the commodity prices, the 
erosion of the predictive content of future prices is a matter of serious concern across all policy 
areas. Furthermore, the weakening and changing equilibrium relationship between crude oil and 
natural gas prices, as documented by numerous time series studies, is potentially making the task 
of managing energy price volatility even more difficult. 
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